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Executive Summary
This paper provides an update of the U.S. fiscal and generational
imbalances that we originally calculated in Gokhale and Smetters
(2003) and presents the calculations in several alternativeways. We
find that a lot has changed in just a fewyears. In particular, the
nation's fiscal imbalance has grown from around $44 triffionas of fiscal
year-end 2002 to about $63 trillion, mostly due to the recent adoption
of the prescription drug bill (Medicare, Part D). The imbalance also
grows by more than $1.5 trillion (in inflation adjusted terms) each year
that action is not taken to reduce it.
This imbalance now equals about 8 percent of all futuregross do-
mestic product (GDP) and it could, in theory, be eliminated bymore
than doubling the employer-employee payroll tax from 15.3percent of
wages to over 32 percent immediately and foreverassuming, quite
critically, no reduction in labor supply or national saving and capital
formation. Massive cuts in government spending would also be
required to achieve fiscal balance: the total federal fiscal imbalance
now equals 77.8 percent of nonSocial Security and non-Medicare
outlays.
1.Introduction
The oldest baby boomers will attain Social Security's early retirement
age of 62 in 2008, and wifi become eligible for Medicare benefits by
2011. As this generation enters retirement, the population share of
retirees will climb rapidly, increasing from about 20 percent today to
37 percent by 2035. Projected longevity improvementsmean that the
retiree population share will continue to increase gradually during the194 Gokhale and Smetters
remainder of this century. This ongoing and irreversible processof
population aging in the United States will exert tremendous pressure
on government budgets in terms ofboth their size and composition.
Combined with the politically inflexible eligibility andbenefit rules
of entitlement programs, population aging wifi induce ashift in federal
budget priorities from discretionary spending such asdefense, infra-
structure, education, and research and development tomandatory out-
lays such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Ifthe increase in
these mandatory outlays cannot be controlled, maintaininggrowth in
discretionary outlays to keep pace with overall economicgrowth wifi
require higher taxes. An important additional factorthat is likely to
cause the share of governmentin the economy to grow is the rapid
projected increase in health-care costswhich have historically grown
at a much faster pace than general price inflation.
We have argued elsewhere that fiscal policymakingwould become
easier if the impending change in federal budget priorities were
preceded by an adjustment in our fiscal vocabularythat is, byadopt-
ing new measures to gauge the federal government'sfiscal health
(Gokhale and Smetters 2003).1 Traditional measuressuch asannual
deficits and debt held by the public projected for a limitednumber of
future yearsare not adequate for providing lawmakerswith the in-
formation necessary for enacting new policies in the presenceof the
age wave. The backward-looking natureof these measures makes it
difficult to gauge whether the future fiscal commitments createdby
laws that Congress enacts are affordable or not. These measuresalso
bias Congress's decisions, inducing rejection of reforms thatcould im-
prove the nation's long-termfiscal outlook by undertaking a short-
term sacrifice.
The two measures that we have proposed in the past arecalled the
fiscal imbalance (Fl) and the generational imbalance (GI)(Gokhale
and Smetters 2003). The most important differences betweentradi-
tional fiscal measures and our proposed measures are thatthe latter
are forward-looking and apply a timediscount to future dollar flows.
The Fl measure equals the current level of debt held bythe public (rep-
resenting past overspending) plus the presentdiscounted value of
future federal non-interest expenditures less the presentdiscounted
value of future federal receipts.2'3 In other words, Fl showsthe extent
to which current U.S. federal fiscal policy is notsustainable. Fl equals
zero for a sustainable (or balanced)policywherein outstanding debt
held by the public plus future spending commitments arebalancedFiscal and Generational Imbalances 195
with future receipts in present value. While FT encompasses all federal
programs, it can also be calculated separately for specific federal pro-
grams, including Social Security.
The H measure includes all future federal financial shortfalls with-
out a time limit. Of course, it can also be calculated under a finite time
horizon. But truncating the calculation in this way could seriously mis-
state the size of the total FT because it would ignore the present value
of shortfalls accruing outside the particular choice of budget window.
Under current U.S. fiscal policy, our estimates suggest that even if the
federal budget window were extended from the normal five-year or
ten-year window to seventy-five years (the standard projection win-
dow used by the Social Security and Medicare trustees), the projected
shortfall would miss over half of the true present value imbalance.
Restricting attention to such truncated calculations of fiscal shortfalls
could significantly bias policymaking toward obtaining short-term
benefits at the expense of policies with short-term costs but larger
long-term gains. This short-term policy bias would make current gen-
erations better off at the expense of future ones.
Even the FT measure, however, does not fully reflect this policy bias.
For example, a strict pay-as-you-go financed retirement benefit has no
effect on either traditional budget measures or on FT since the costs of
such a program are, by construction, financed out of contemporaneous
receipts. Still, such a program would transfer resources toward older
people who would receive a benefit without having paid much in taxes
when working. Such a program would reduce national savings and in-
crease interest rates, as was pointed out in a seminal work by Feldstein
(1974). Under a dynamically efficient economy (one in which the
steady-state interest rate exceeds the growth rate), this transfer to older
generations is financed by younger and future generations, who pay
more taxes under this program relative to their benefits in present
value.
To capture the intergenerational redistributive effects of such pay-
as-you-go policies, we also proposed a second, complementary mea-
surethe generational imbalance (GI). This measure calculates the
contribution of past and current generations to Fl, that is, the amount
of overspending by past and current generations under current law. In
other words, whereas FT shows the extent to which current fiscal policy
is not sustainable, GI measures the amount by which benefits to past
and current generations (including prospective benefits of current
generations) exceed their tax payments (including prospective tax196 Gokhale and Smetters
payments by current generations) in present value. The GI measure is
also useful in estimating the amount by which such obligations induce
a reduction in national saving and capital formation.
The GI measure is calculated under projections of taxes and benefits
and assuming continuation of current policies throughout the lifetimes
of current generations. Therefore, GI can be interpreted as the amount
of implicit debt under current fiscal policy that past and current gener-
ations are passing to future generations, who must finance it through
tax payments in excess of their benefits in present value. The amount
of implicit debt can be changed, however, by changing current fiscal
policy.
Most policy changes wifi affect both GI and FT. As noted earlier,
however, a strictly pay-as-you-go-financed programwherein higher
benefits to older generations are fully financed out of higher taxes
levied on working generationswould, by construction, have no im-
pact on FT. But such a program would cause a potentially large in-
crease in GI. Thus, while GI provides important information on the
effect of fiscal policy on national savings, it also provides a complemen-
tary measure of policy sustainability. For instance, one could conceive
of policies that are sustainable in a traditional static-scoring sense (i.e.,
for which FT = 0) but involve a very high implicit debt, as reflected in a
high value of GI, which would produce unrealistically large tax hikes
or benefits cuts.
Unfortunately, the GI measure can be cleanly estimated only for
certain federal programs whose benefits and taxes can be easily distrib-
uted across the recipient population. For such programs, the GI mea-
sure indicates the contribution of past and current generations to the
program's total FT.
This paper reports updated calculations of the infinite-horizon FT and
GI measures. Our calculations are based on long-term federal spending
and revenue projections made for the Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment for fiscal year 2005, the latest long-term budget projections
available to us. We report the calculationsparticularly Medicare's
estimatesin several alternative ways, and we report the sensitivity of
our results to different economic assumptions. We also report limited-
horizon FT measures over budget windows of five, ten, twenty-five,
fifty, and seventy-five years, and we show how those calculations
would potentially severely bias fiscal policy decision-making.
Since the publication of our book (Gokhale and Smetters 2003), the
nation's fiscal position has dramatically worsened, even relative to theFiscal and Generational Imbalances 197
alarmingly large estimates that we presented two years ago. In particu-
lar, the FT has increased from around $44.2 trillion (expressed in con-
stant 2002 dollars) to about $63.3 trillion (expressed in constant 2004
dollars). Restating the 2002 estimate of FT in 2004 dollars makes it equal
to $45.9 trillion. About $3.4 trillion of the difference between this and
Fl as of fiscal year-end 2004 ($63.3 trillion) arises from the accrual of in-
terest over two years (calculated in inflation adjusted terms). The en-
actment in 2003 of the prescription drug benefit (Medicare, Part D)
adds $24.2 trillion to FT as of fiscal year-end 2004 (including one year's
interest cost since enactment). However, the Office of Management
and Budget's (OMB's) more favorable long-term productivity outlook
reduced FT on the rest-of-federal-government account by $6.2 triffion,
arising mainly from higher non-payroll-tax revenues. The remaining
difference is explained by changes in revenue and outlay projections
for Social Security and Medicareespecially reductions in Medicare
Parts A and B outlays resulting from the introduction of Medicare
Part D.
The GI measure indicates massive overspending by past and cur-
rent generations in just the Social Security and Medicare programs
to the tune of $33.6 trillion. Again, this is under the assumption that
general-revenue transfers are appropriated by the federal government
for Medicare Parts B and D. Alternatively, if general-revenue transfers
were viewed as dedicated to the Medicare program, the total GI value
for Social Security and Medicare would equal $26.1 triffion.
Achieving fiscal balance would require either massive tax increases
(e.g., more than doubling the employer-employee combined payroll
tax immediately and forever) or massive cuts in government outlays,
for example, a 77.8 percent immediate and permanent reduction in all
non-Social Security and non-Medicare outlays. Such a sharp increase
in taxes would likely send the U.S. economy into a tailspin and, there-
fore, pass along to future generations an economy that is in worse
shape than the economy that baby boomers inherited from their
parents. A sharp decrease in Social Security, health care, and other ben-
efits, however, could entail significant hardship for retirees unless ben-
efits could be reduced in a sufficiently progressive manner.
The FT and GI measures have now also been published by Social
Security's and Medicare's trustees in their annual reports, starting with
Social Security in 2003 and then both programs in 2004 and 2005.
These presentations have been endorsed by the 2003 Social Security
advisory board's technical panel on assumptions and methods (Social198 Gokhale and Smetters
Security Advisory Board 2003), which is composed of several prom-
inent economists and actuaries outside the Social Security Adminis-
tration. The calculations reported herein differ from the trustees'
estimates because our calculations are based on long-term budget
projections made under the administration's economic assumptions,
whereas the trustees use their own set of assumptions, including a
smaller interest rate and a smaller rate of productivity growth. As a re-
sult, the imbalances that we report for the Social Security and Medicare
programs are actually somewhat smaller than what they find.
In addition to the Social Security trustees, the Federal Accounting
Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) is actively considering ways to
broaden the definition of liabilities associated with social insurance
programs for purposes of financial reporting by the federal govern-
ment. Doing so would be consistent with representing more fully
the future implications of current lawssuch as those of entitlement
programsthat prescribe criteria for benefit eligibility and benefit
amounts payable to those eligible until such time that Congress acts to
change those laws.
Finally, the current administration appears to have endorsed, in
principle, the formal reporting of future federal obligations and
anchoring the legislative budget process on such measures. The fiscal
year 2006 Budget of the United States Government calls for the follow-
ing reforms:
First, the Administration proposes a point of order against legislation which
worsens the long-term unfunded obligation of major entitlements. The specific
programs covered would be those programs with long term actuarial projec-
tions, including Social Security, Medicare, Federal civilian and military retire-
ment, veterans disabifity compensation, and Supplemental Security Income.
Additional programs would be added once it becomes feasible to make long-
term actuarial estimates for those programs.
Second, the Administration proposes new reporting requirements to high-
light legislative actions worsening unfunded obligations. These requirements
would require the Administration, as part of the President's Budget, to report
on any enacted legislation in the past year that worsens the unfunded obliga-
tions of the specified programs.4
2.Estimates of U.S. Federal Fiscal Imbalances
This section presents calculations of the U.S. federal government's fis-
cal imbalances, using the Office of Management and Budget's long-
range projections (made through the year 2080) as a starting point,Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 199
that are consistent with the federal budget for fiscal year 2005. Our
long-range assumptions underlying our projections include an annual
labor productivity growth rate (change in hourly labor compensation)
of 1.8 percent per year and a consumer price inflation of 2.5 percent
per year. Present values are calculated using a discount rate of 3.65
percent per yearconsistent with the rates on outstanding thirty-year
Treasury securities.5
Table 6.1 presents FT estimates for the entire federal government as
well as separately for Social Security, Medicare, and rest-of-federal-
government account. The federal government's total fiscal imbalance
amounts to more than $63 trillion in 2004. Social Security contributes
"only" $8 trillion to total federal FT.
Total federal FT equals 8 2 percent of the present value of future
GDP. Some analysts prefer this measure of the total imbalance because
it compares FT to the economy's resource base. However, because only
about half of GDP is subject to taxation, the imbalance-to-GDP ratio
measure severely understates the difficulty in financing such a large
fiscal imbalance. Indeed, as shown in table 6.1, Fl equals to 18.0 per-
cent of all future uncapped payrollsthe present value of Medicare's
tax base, which, unlike Social Security, does not impose a taxable
wage ceiling.
In other words, even with a zero labor supply elasticitya heroic
assumption that almost all economists would dispute at existing tax
ratesbalancing the federal government's intertemporal budget con-
straint would require more than doubling the employer-employee
combined payroll tax of 15.3 percent to more that 33.3 percent perma-
nently and forever. Note, however, that the vast majority of the current
15.3 percent tax rate is levied only on earnings below the wage ceiling.
In other words, both a large tax rate increase and a base broadening
would be required to achieve fiscal balance under this hypothetical
policy scenario.
More realistically, of course, labor supply would sharply fall in
response to such a tax increase (Feldstein 1996, Prescott 2004). We con-
jecture that federal tax increases alone could never be successful in
reducing the federal FT to zero. This view is only strengthened when
we consider that many states are facing budget crises of their own due
to rising Medicaid costsfiscal imbalances that the calculations
reported here ignore.6'7 The extent to which federal taxes can be
increased are therefore further limited by the need to increase revenues






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.202 Gokhale and Smetters
federal spending reductions will have to play an important role in
resolving the federal government's fiscal imbalance.
2.1Alternative Presentations of Medicare's Portion of F!
In our book, Gokhale and Smetters (2003), we presented Medicare's
portion of the total FT by ignoring the general revenue transfers
received by Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance).
About 75 percent of Medicare Part B's outlays are financed out of gen-
eral revenues. Moreover, Medicare Part D (prescription drug cover-
age), which was enacted after the publication of our book, is entirely
financed out of general revenue transfers. Some commentaries cor-
rectly disputed our representation of the entire burden of Medicare's
general revenue financing as Medicare's fiscal imbalance. That's be-
cause Medicare Parts B and D are not intended to be fullyfinanced
from dedicated federal receipts; to ignore general revenue contribu-
tions is to essentially ignore this aspect of current law and therefore to
disregard the explicit intent of the U.S. Congress to partly finance
Medicare out of general revenues. Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2004),
for example, consider several alternative methods of presenting Medi-
care's shortfalls.
We stifi believe that the best way of presenting Medicare's shortfalls
is to offset outlays by only its dedicated payroll taxes. The reason for
thisbased on budget accounting principles and not political or eco-
nomic onesis that the reported contribution of any program to the
federal government's overall FT should reflect the budgetary savings
(reduction in Fl) generated by eliminating that program. Of course, we
are not advocating Medicare's elimination. Rather, we favor accounting
for Medicare's contribution to the FT by measuring the total amount of
burdens generated by that program. Otherwise, the purpose of the cal-
culations (measuring budgetary costs arising from operating federal
programs) would become unclear.
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness and to acknowledge that
Congress intended Medicare to be partly financed out of general reve-
nues, we present Medicare's contribution to total federal FT under two
alternative views. Firstand the approach we prefergeneral reve-
nue transfers are ignored by assuming that these transfers areannually
appropriated for Medicare Parts B and D. Medicare's FT in 2004 is
about $61 trillion under this perspective. Under the second view, we
include general revenue transfers by assuming that they are dedicated
to these two subprograms, in which case Medicare's FT is substantially
lower$18 trillion.Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 203
Regardless of one's view of how Medicare's finances should be rep-
resented, however, total federal FT remains unchanged at $63 trillion,
as shown in table 6.1. When general revenue transfers are included as
part of Medicare's finances, the contribution to FT by the "rest of fed-
eral government" simply increases by about $43 trillion, the difference
between the two alternative measures of Medicare's FT.8
2.2 A Growing Fiscal Problem
Table 6.1 also shows that the fiscal imbalance is growing by about $2
triffion each year, or by about 20 percent of this year's GDP. Like a cor-
pus of debt, an outstanding total federal Fl accrues interest over time.9
Under current estimates, its value wifi grow from $63.3 trillion at year-
end 2004 to $79.4 trillion by year-end 2010 if policies and projections
remain unchanged in the interim. However, a seemingly more optimis-
tic view, also shown in table 6.1, indicates that the imbalance grows
from 8.2 percent of all future GDP in 2004 to 8.3 percent of all future
GDP in 2005. Relative to all future uncapped payroll, FT grows from
18.0 percent in 2004 to 18.3 percent in 2005.
The advantage of dividing Fl by the present value of all future GDP
or uncapped payroll is that this measure accounts for the fact that not
only does FT grow over time but GDP and uncapped payrolls grow as
well. Indeed, if the economy's capital stock were exactly at or above
the golden rule levelimplying that the economy's interest rate is less
than or equal to the economy's growth ratethe ratio of FT relative to
all future GDP (or uncapped payrolls) would not grow over time (see
the discussion in the appendix). In that case, of course, federal deficits
would not matter eitherin fact, reducing national saving would be
Pareto improving. The U.S. economy would be in Paul Samuelson's
(1958) hypothetical world in which Ponzi games are feasible in the
long run. Empirical studies, however, have rejected the hypothesis
that the U.S. economy is dynamically inefficient (e.g., Abel et al. 1989).
The time-path of the ratio of FT to GDP or payrolls shown in table 6.1
indicates the trade-off available to policymakers between adopting
smaller policy changes (tax increases or benefit reductions) effective
immediately, or larger ones that would become effective after some
years have passed.
Nonetheless, exactly how to report FT's growth over timewhether
as a dollar figure or relative to the present value of GDP or uncapped
payrollhas generated a heated debate. For example, Dr. Paul
Krugman, a well-known economist and colunmist at the New York
Times, has repeatedly criticized President Bush for claiming that Social204 Gokhale and Smetters
Security's contribution to FT worsens by about $600 billion each year,
as now estimated by the Social Security trustees.'° Dr. Krugman's ar-
gument apparently rests on the fact that the growth of Social Security's
FT relative to the present value of future GDP or payroll does not appear
as alarming.11
However, Dr. Krugman can only reject the $600 billion figure if he
also rejects the budget accounting system currently being used by the
federal government in favor of the FT and GI metrics. But elsewhere,
Krugman has referred to Social Security's FT estimate, which is now
being produced by the Social Security trustees, as a scare tactic.'2 His
positions, therefore, seem inconsistent to us. Indeed, the president's
claim that Social Security's problem worsens by $600 billion each year
is consistent with the standard deficit language that indicates the dollar
amount that the national debt grows each year. The president's mes-
sage simply emphasizes the need to look ahead rather than restrict
attention to conventional cash-flow deficit as a guidepost for fiscal
policymakers.
3.Social Security's Fiscal and Generational Imbalances
Table 6.2 shows a decomposition of Social Security's FT into two com-
ponentsGI, which shows the contribution to FT on account of past
and current generations (those age 15 and older during the fiscal year
being considered), and FT minus GI, which shows the contribution to
FT that future generations are scheduled to make under current poli-
cies. The first row of table 6.2 repeats Social Security's FT shown in
table 6.1 (in constant 2004 dollars) for the sake of comparison.
The second row of table 6.2 shows the generational imbalance on
account of Social Security. As it turns out, Social Security's GI is larger
in present value than its Fl, indicating that more than 100 percent
of this program's FT is accounted for by the excess of benefits over pay-
roll taxes in present value scheduled to be awarded to past and living
generations.
The third row of table 6.2 shows that Social Security's GI can be
decomposed into two parts: the first part is the present value of pro-
spective excess benefits over payroll taxes that those age 15 and older
wifi receive. As of fiscal year-end 2004, this part equals $11.2 triffion.
The second part is the accumulated (present) value of excess benefits
paid in the past compared to payroll taxes received by the Social Secu-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.206 Gokhale and Smetters
taxes paid to those alive today (age 15 and older) and those no longer
alive since the system's inception in 1935. As of 2004, this value isnega-
tive$1.6 trillion, indicating past accruals of payroll tax surpluses in the
Social Security Trust Fund. Adding these two parts yields the fiscal
year-end 2004 value of GI$9.5 trfflion.
Because Social Security's FT is smaller than its GI, the difference, FT
minus GI, is negative. Thus, under current policies, future generations
(those age 14 and younger and those that wifi be born in the future)
wifipaymore in the present value of payroll taxes compared to the
present value of their Social Security benefits. The present value of
future generations' excess payroll tax payments equals $1.5 trillion. De-
spite this overpayment, they will be asked to pay even more (or receive
even less)about $8 trillion morein order to produce asustainable
system unless Social Security is refonned soon.
4.Medicare's Fiscal and Generational Imbalances
In the following discussion we will adopt the convention of represent-
ing Medicare's imbalance under our preferred perspective, which does
not assume that general revenue transfers represent a free revenue
source to Medicare. Table 6.3 shows FT and GI values for Medicare
and its component programs [hospital insurance (Part A), supplemen-
tary medical insurance (or Part B), and the prescription drug benefit
(Part D)].
Medicare's overall imbalance equals $60.9 trillion under current
policies. Similar to the procedure used by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services in making long-range health care projections, the
Office of Management and Budget's long-range budget projections
assume that future federal health care outlays per capita wifi grow
about 1 percent faster than GDP per capita through the next 75 years.
Thereafter, this growth rate wedge is tapered down to equal GDP
growth per capita.13 Table 6.4 shows, however, that total (economy-
wide) medical spending per capita has increased by 1.6 percent per
year since 1980 and federal health-care outlay growth has averaged 1.8
percent (calculated exponentially) during the same period. This is
much faster than assumed in official long-range federal budget projec-
tions used to calculate the FT and GI values of table 6.3. That makes
the FT and CI estimates reported here considerably more conservative
compared to those that would be obtained under a health care growth
assumption closer to its historical average.Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 207
We estimate Medicare's overall FT to be $60.9 triffion as of fiscal year-
end 2004. That equals 79 percent of GDPalmost equaling the entire
federal FT of 8.2 percent. Medicare's Fl equals 17.3 percent of the pres-
ent value of uncapped payrolls. Despite the very conservative assump-
tion about health care outlay growth, that's more than seven times
larger than Social Security's FT.
Waiting until 2010 to change policies on Medicare's revenues or ben-
efits would increase the program's FT to $75.6 trillionincreasing it as
a share of GDP to 8.5 percent. Viewed alternatively, the additional
resources required through policy changes in 2010 would be equiva-
lent to imposing a tax of 18.6 percent of uncapped payrolls instead of
17.3 percent were the policy change undertaken immediately.
Table 6.3 also decomposes Medicare's FT into those computed on
account of its sub-programs. Medicare Part A's and Part B's FIs are al-
most identicalbetween $18.0 and $19.0 trillion each as of fiscal year-
end 2004. The Medicare prescription drug program's FT is larger by 25
percentvalued at $24.0 trillion.
A noteworthy difference between Social Security and Medicare is
that GT constitutes a much smaller share in FT for Medicare than for So-
cial Security.'4 Recall that more than 100 percent of Social Security's FT
is accounted for by generous benefits awarded to past and scheduled
for current generations compared to their payroll taxes, whereas future
generations are projected to pay more in Social Security payroll taxes
than they will receive in benefits. In contrast, Medicare's GT contributes
only two-fifths of its total FT of $60.9 trillion and, under current Medi-
care tax and benefit rules, future generations are projected to receive
$36.8 triffion more in future health care benefits than they wifi pay in
present value of taxes. This result arises because much of Medicare's
large FT is caused by rapid growth in future health care costs and out-
lays. Indeed, the conservative assumptions used in making future
health care outlay projections suggest that these estimates may signifi-
cantly understate Medicare's FT and significantly overstate the percent-
age contribution of Medicare's GI to its FT.
5.Comparison with Estimates by the Social Security and Medicare
Trustees
Table 6.5 compares this paper's FT and GI estimates with those of So-
cial Security and Medicare's trustees that are published in their 2005
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.212 Gokhale and Smetters
Table 6.4
Growth in Health Care Expenditures per Capita, 1980 and 2003
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (see http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/l-iistorical/tl.asp). Figures for the
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U, current series) are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics' web site.
Table 6.5
Comparison with Official Estimates for Social Security and Medicare (Present Values in





National health expenditures $1,067 $5,670 3.2 1.6
Private 612 3,084 3.1 1.5
Public 455 2,586 3.3 1.8
Federal 310 1,829 3.4 1.8
State and local 146 757 3.2 1.6
Prescription drugs 52 605 4.7 3.2
Memo items:
GDPpercapita 12,130 37,176 2.1 0.6
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trillion by the trustees, whereas it is just $9.5 trillion under the eco-
nomic assumptions of the Office of Management and Budget. When
we lower the discount rate from 3.65 percent to 3.30 percent, Social
Security's FT increases to $11.5 triffionhigher than the trustees' esti-
mate. That is, adopting the trustees' discount rate assumption would
result in an even higher estimate of that program's unfunded obliga-
tion. Why the difference? The answer is OMB's higher productivity
growth rate assumption-1.8 percent per year compared to 1.6 per-
cent. Faster economic growth results in higher future tax revenues but
also larger benefit obligations because of Social Security benefits. As
it turns out, faster economic growth increases rather than reduces So-
cial Security's unfunded obligations. In the words of the program's
trustees:
While faster real wage growth.. results in increased tax revenue somewhat
before it increases benefit levels, the cumulative additional growth in wage
levels eventually results in greater dollar increases in the relatively large pro-
jected cost of the OASDI [Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance] pro-
gram than in the smaller projected tax revenues. Thus, eventually, faster real
wage growth, alone, results in an increase in the unfunded obligation of the
program.15
The Medicare trustees' estimate of the infinite horizon unfunded
obligations for Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) equals $24.1 tril-
lion, much higher than our estimate of $18.1 trillion. However, the pro-
portion of FT contributed by GI is about 40 percent under both sets of
estimates. For Medicare Part B, the trustees report an unfunded obliga-
tion of zero. That's because their reporting convention counts general
revenue transfers to Medicare Part B as dedicated rather than appro-
priated for the program. Using our preferred approach of viewing gen-
eral revenue transfers as appropriated, Medicare Part B's unfunded
obligation equals $25.8 triffion. Again, GI contributes just under 40
percent of Medicare Part B's unfunded obligations under both sets of
estimates.
Estimates of Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage), shown in
table 6.5, differ considerably. The trustees' estimate is smaller at $18.2
triffion, whereas ours is $24.2 trillion. Our estimate is based on OMB's
projections of growth in prescription drug outlays. Reportedly, these
projections are based on higher growth rates through 2040, as seen in
figure b.1. Agam, nowever, the ratios or (iiI to F! are quite similar uncter
both sets of estimates.214 Gokhale and Smetters
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Figure 6.1
Medicare Part D's Projected Outlays as a Percentage of Projected GDP
Except for the magnitude of Medicare Part D outlay projections,
the comparison of the two sets of estimates suggests broad agreement
regarding the future projections for Social Security and Medicare and
their allocation across past and current versus future generations. This
is not, of course, surprising because 0MB usually receives projections
for both programs' revenues and outlays from their respective admin-
istrative agencies based on OMB's economic assumptions. For Medi-
care Part D expenditures projected in the fiscal year 2005 budget, 0MB
staff assumed higher outlay growth through the year 2040 (see figure
6.1).16 These growth rates appear to be consistent with historical
growth in economy-wide prescription drug expenditures (see table
6.4).
6.Estimates Under Alternative Budget Windows
Table 6.6 shows FT for selected budget windows. The last column of
table 6.6 repeats the infinite horizon FT measure. It is clear from the
numbers that calculating FT over short budget windows significantly
understates the financial shortfall that the federal government faces.
For example, the regularly reported budget window for the 0MB
is five years into the future. Over this period, the sum of Social Secu-
rity's, Medicare's, and the rest of the federal government's fiscal im-
balances amounts to $4.5 trillion. Over the Congressional Budget
Office's (CBO's) regular budget-reporting horizon of ten years, the total
00MB FY'05 Budget
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Table 6.6
Fiscal Imbalances for Selected Budget Windows as of Fiscal Year-End 2004 (Billions of
Dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.
federal imbalance equals $4.1 trillion. Longer horizon fiscal imbalances
are larger. For example, over the next fifty years, total federal FT equals
$13.5 trillion. The short-term estimates of FT are much smaller because
they ignore financial shortfalls accruing after the budget window's
terminal year. Even the seventy-five-year FT estimate for the entire fed-
eral government equals only about one-third of the FT calculated in
perpetuity.
7.Fl and CI Estimates Under Alternative Productivity Growth
Assumptions
Table 6.7 shows estimates of FT for fiscal year 2004 under alterna-
tive assumptions of productivity growth and discount rates. Variation
around the labor-productivity growth assumption equals ±50 basis
points. Thus, the "high" and "low" productivity growth estimates
correspond to labor productivity growth rates of 2.3 percent and 1.3
percent per year, respectively. Variation around the discount rate as-
sumption equals ±25 basis points per year. Thus, estimates under high
and low discount rates reflect discounting at 3.9 and 3.4 percent per
year, respectively. Finally, variation around the health care growth
wedge assumption equals ±50 basis points: estimates under the high
and low assumptions reflect health care growth rate wedges of 1.5 and













Total federal government 4,593 4,125 5,18513,568 23,58063,284
Social Security -2,051-2,430-2,136 -45 1,742 8,006
Medicare 405 1,178 4,97815,01025,28260,886






Social Security 1,915 1,915 1,915 1,915 1,915 1,915



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 217
The FT for fiscal year 2004 is quite sensitive to variations in the dis-
count rate. It is estimated to be $84 trillion under the low discount rate
(3.4 percent) and $49 trillion under the high one (3.9 percent). The wide
variation in FT estimates for small changes in the discount rate is only
to be expected because a large share of total federal FT accrues after
several decades have passed.
Normally, such wide variations in Fl arising from small changes in
the discount rate are taken as an indication that the FT measure is not
reliable or useful. However, as we have argued in Gokhale and Smet-
ters (2003), wide variations in FT triggered by discount rate changes
confirm the need to adopt longer-term calculations because they indi-
cate that a large fraction of the imbalance accrues after several decades
have passeda component that would be ignored under truncated
horizons. For example, table 6.6 shows that about two-thirds of the to-
tal federal FT would arise under current policies after another seventy-
five years have passed, and it is well known that a given change in the
interest rate imposes a larger discount effect on fund flows that occur
further out into the future.
Table 6.7 shows that FT equals $85.7 trillion under the high produc-
tivity growth rate assumption (2.3 percent). Social Security's fiscal im-
balance increases from $8.0 triffion under baseline assumptions to
$12.7 triffion when high productivity growth assumption is intro-
duced. A considerable increase in FT also emerges in Medicare under
the high productivity growth assumption. Note that increasing pro-
ductivity growth also leads to higher growth in federal health care out-
lays because those outlays are assumed to grow 1 percentage point
faster than growth in output per worker. The opposite result obtains
when productivity growth is lowered to 1.3 percent per year. In that
case, Medicare's FT is estimated to be $41.9 trillion.
Increasing or reducing the health-care growth wedge also consider-
ably affects the total federal FT. Increasing the wedge by 50 basis points
(from 1 percentage point to 1.5 percentage points) increases total fed-
eral FT by more than $12 triffion, to $75.8 trillion, and reducing the
wedge by 50 basis points (to 0.5 percentage point) reduces federal FT
to $52.4 trillion.
These wide variations in dollar estimates of FT may make this mea-
sure appear to be unsuitable as a guide for policymakers. However, a
more stable measure of the size of the federal government's financial
shortfall under current policies may be to view it as a ratio to GDP or218 Gokhale and Smetters
Table 6.8
Sensitivity of Total Federal Fiscal Imbalance as a Percentage of the Present Values of







a tax base. When expressed relative to the present value of taxes, this
ratio shows the size of the tax increase that would be needed to create
a sustainable fiscal federal policy.
Table 6.8 shows federal FT in perpetuity as a ratio, alternatively,
to the present value of GDP and the present value of total payrolls.
These ratios exhibit less volatility than dollar estimates because the
denominator (the present value of GDP or payrolls) changes in the
same direction as does FT in response to changes in each of the three
assumptions. For example, although FT under high productivity
growth ($85.8 trillion) is roughly double its size under the low produc-
tivity assumption ($47.3 trillion), the difference in its ratio to GDP is
much less divergent-8.6 under the high-productivity assumption and
7.5 under the low-productivity assumption. Table 6.8 shows that, as a
ratio of the present value of payrolls, FT ranges between 16.2 and 19.0
percent in response to the changes in productivity and discount rate
assumptions considered here. In sum, while FT expressed in dollars is
sensitive to the choice of interest rate and productivity, the size of the
policy change itself that is necessary to eliminate the imbalance is fairly
stable.
The variation in this ratio, however, is much larger under alternative
assumptions on the size of the health-care growth rate wedge. Were
health care outlays to grow 50 basis points faster immediately and
permanentlysomething that the historical evidence on health care
growth suggests is quite feasible (see table 6.4)resolving the federal
fiscal imbalance would require appropriating 21.5 percent of all future
payroll. In contrast, were it possible to reduce the growth of health-
care costs by 50 basis points, 14.9 percent of future payroll would still
be needed to create a sustainable fiscal system.
GDP Total Payrolls
BaselineHigh Low BaselineHigh Low
8.2 7.4 9.2 18.0 16.2 20.2
8.2 8.6 7.5 18.0 19.0 16.4
8.2 9.8 6.8 18.0 21.5 14.9Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 219
There is an interesting difference between the estimates reported
in table 6.8 and those reported in Gokhale and Smetters (2003). Tn
our 2003 book, FT as a share of the present value of payrolls was
smaller compared to the baseline when productivity growth was
assumed to be faster and, symmetrically, was larger when productivity
growth was assumed to be slower. However, the estimates reported
in Gokhale and Smetters (2003) were made prior to the enactment of
sizable additional benefits made available through the Medicare pre-
scription drug law (Medicare Part D). The estimates reported here,
however, include the effects of that law. With the addition of the drug
benefits, the higher health-care growth rate accompanying the assump-
tion of higher overall productivity growth results in a larger increase in
projected benefit outlays compared to the increase in total projected
payrolls. The reason is that the prescription drug benefit wifi begin
paying benefits more quickly than the rate at which the payroll tax
base grows.
Conclusion
This paper updates calculations of U.S. federal fiscal and generational
imbalances. The result published in Gokhale and Smetters (2003) of a
$44 trillion total federal fiscal imbalance as of fiscal year-end 2002 is
now revised to $63 trillion. A small part of the increase arises from the
accrual of interet on the existing fiscal imbalance. A large part of the
increase comes from the enactment of significant additional Medicare
benefits through the new prescription drug benefit. That law alone
accounts for an increase in FT by $24 trillion.
The nation faces an extremely difficult challenge in implementing fis-
cal adjustments to reduce the fiscal imbalance built into today's fiscal
policies. Given the large magnitude of the overall fiscal imbalance, its
resolution from higher taxes alone is likely to trigger negative eco-
nomic effects and does not appear to be feasible. Hence, a sizable part
of the adjustment wifi be required through cuts in discretionary federal
outlays and reductions in future entitlement obligations.
Appendix
This Appendix shows how the ratio of Fiscal Tmbalance relative to GDP
as well as the ratio of Generational Imbalance relative to GDP change
over time when there are no changes in fiscal policy and projections.220 Gokhale and Smetters
9.1Ratio of Fiscal Imbalance to the Present Value of GDP
In Appendix A of Gokhale and Smetters (2003) we show [in equation
(6.1)1 that absent changes in fiscal policies and budget projections, the
fiscal imbalance measure grows at a rate equal to the rate of interest.
That is:
= FIR1 (6.1)
Here, Fit stands for the fiscal imbalance calculated as of time period t,
and R = 1/(1 + r) stands for the discount factor, with r as the annual
interest rate on long-term government debt.
Let Yt stand for the discounted present value of GDP as of period t.
If annual GDP in year t, y, grows at rate g per year, and G represents










Divide both sides of equation (6.1) by Y
sion by using equation (6.3) to get:
Fit+iFi (Ri1 (64) - Y kG)
Under normal conditions the economy is dynamically efficientthat
is, g < r, implying that G > R. Hence, we can specify in general that:
Flt±1Fit
(6.5)
and manipulate the expres-Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 221
That is, absent changes in policy and projections, the ratio of the fiscal
imbalance to GDP grows larger over time. Thus, the share of GDP that
must be devoted to resolving the fiscal imbalance increases if correc-
tive policy changes are postponed.
9.2Ratio of Generational Imbalance to the Present Value of GDP
In equation (A9) of our book (Gokhale and Smetters 2003), we show
that:
RGI+j GI' =RNT+i (6.6)
Here, GI stands for the generational imbalance in period t, and NT
represents the present value lifetime net transfers to those born in pe-
riod t as scheduled under current fiscal policies. Written alternatively:
GI+1 = GIR1 + NT+i (6.7)
Equation (6.7) says that next period's GI equals this period's GI accu-
mulated at the rate of interest plus the present value of the lifetime net
transfer scheduled to be awarded to next period's newborn cohort
under current fiscal policies.
Dividing both sides of equation (6.7) by Y and using equation (6.3)





That is, whether the ratio of GI to GDP grows faster, just as fast, or
slower than the ratio of Fl to GDP depends on whether NTt+i0.
Notes
The authors thank James Poterba for very helpful comments. The opinions and con-
clusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
opinions of the Cato Institute or The Wharton School. The authors thank the Office of
Management and Budget for providing long-term budget projections and Felicitie Bell of
the Social Security Administration for providing demographic projections and related
underlying assumptions.
Others, for example, Auerbach et al. (2004), have also called for adopting fiscal mea-
sures based on a forward-looking accounting for the federal budget.
This measure has also been used by Auerbach, Gale and, Orszag (2004) and has been
advocated by Alan Auerbach for over a decade now (e.g., Auerbach 1994). A key differ-
ence with our FT measure is that we focus on the implications of current law using a
micro-based estimation model. In contrast, these authors alter future policy in directions
they regard as realistic by extending aggregate Congressional Budget office projections.
(6.8)222 Gokhale and Smetters
The FT measure is also different from the generational balance measure first developed
by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991). The generational balance concept involves a
hypothetical policy whereby future generations are arbitrarily assigned equal additional
fiscal burdens except for an adjustment for economic growth. That hypothetical policy
balances the government's intertemporal budget but, unlike the Fl measure, is not consis-
tent with a budget conceptthat is, it does not reflect the implications of continuing cur-
rent fiscal policies.
See the Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal year
2006, Chapter 15.
For technical details of our micro-data-based projections and other details, refer to
Gokhale and Smetters (2003). Although OMB's projected long-term interest rates in the
fiscal year 2005 budget are slightly higher, we use a 3.65 percent annual rate to make
present value estimates comparable with those published in Gokhale and Smetters
(2003).
See, for example, Baker, Besendorfer, and Kotlikoff (2002). The fiscal problems that
they measured, however, have likely worsened quite dramatically since their study be-
cause economic growth forecasts have been reduced and Medicaid cost forecasts have
risen.
Our calculations only include the federal share of Medicaid costs (under "rest of fed-
eral government" in the calculations reported later).
We are currently developing the methodology for decomposing the "rest of federal
government" account into GI and FT minus GI components, including defense, transpor-
tation, Medicaid, etc. We intend to present those results in a new paper.
The effective interest accrual on the total federal Fl is a combination of the interest ac-
cruing on outstanding government debt, Social Security and Medicare trust funds, and
the interest rates assumed to prevail during future years. As mentioned earlier, we use in
this calculation the Office of Management and Budget's fiscal year 2004 assumption of a
3.65 percent interest rate on the longest-maturity Treasury securities outstanding.
For the most recent instance of this criticism, see Paul Krugman "Social Security Les-
sons," New York Times, August 15, 2005, page 17.
Karnin and Kogan (2005) offer a more thoughtful critique, which likely influenced
Krugman's thinking.
See Paul Krugman, "The $600 Billion Man," New York Times, March 15, 2005, page 25.
This does not necessarily imply that aggregate Medicare outlays wifi grow no faster
than GDP since one of the factors driving Medicare and GDP is demographic change. To
the extent that the Medicare beneficiary population continues to grow faster than the pro-
ductive population, aggregate Medicare spending would continue to increase at a faster
pace relative to GDP. Our calculations indicate that the difference in the growth rates of
the two aggregates is extremely small after the first seventy-five years and makes little
difference to FT and GT estimates.
This assertion is based on the assumption that general revenue transfers are appro-
priated by Congress for Medicare each year and these funds are not dedicated to the
program.
See the Social Security Trustees' (2005) Annual Report, Chapter IV.B.5, paragraph a.Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 223
16. Based on a phone conversation with a staff member of the Office of Management and
Budget.
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